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Abstract
The present online social media platform is afflicted with sev-
eral issues, with hate speech being on the predominant fore-
front. The prevalence of online hate speech has fuelled hor-
rific real-world hate-crime such as the mass-genocide of Ro-
hingya Muslims, communal violence in Colombo and the re-
cent massacre in the Pittsburgh synagogue. Consequently, It
is imperative to understand the diffusion of such hateful con-
tent in an online setting. We conduct the first study that anal-
yses the flow and dynamics of posts generated by hateful and
non-hateful users on Gab (gab.com) over a massive dataset
of 341K users and 21M posts. Our observations confirms that
hateful content diffuse farther, wider and faster and have a
greater outreach than those of non-hateful users. A deeper
inspection into the profiles and network of hateful and non-
hateful users reveals that the former are more influential, pop-
ular and cohesive. Thus, our research explores the interesting
facets of diffusion dynamics of hateful users and broadens
our understanding of hate speech in the online world.
1 Introduction
The Internet is one of the greatest innovations of mankind
which has brought together people from every race, religion,
and nationality. Social media sites such as Twitter and Face-
book have connected billions of people1 and allowed them
to share their ideas and opinions instantly. That being said,
there are several ill consequences as well such as online ha-
rassment, trolling, cyber-bullying, and hatespeech.
Twitter defines hatespeech2 as any tweet that ‘promotes
violence against other people on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity,
religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease. Even
though several government and social media sites are try-
ing to curb the hatespeech, it is still plaguing our society.
Facebook has been blamed by United Nations investigators
in playing a leading role in the possible genocide of the Ro-
hingya community in Myanmar by spreading hatespeech3.
1https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/25/
facebook-2-5-billion-people
2https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy
3https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate
Sri Lanka has also accused Facebook for instigating anti-
Muslim mob violence that left three people dead4. With hate
crimes increasing in several states5, there is an urgent need
to have a better understanding of how hateful posts spreads
in online social media.
In this paper, we perform the first study which looks into
the diffusion dynamics of hate in online social media. We
choose Gab(Gab.com) for all our analysis. This choice is
primarily motivated by the nature of Gab. Unlike other so-
cial media sites such as Twitter and Facebook, Gab promotes
“free speech” and allows users to post contents that may
be hateful in nature without any fear of repercussion. This
has led to the migration of several Twitter users who were
banned/suspended for violating its terms of service, namely
for abusive and/or hateful behavior (Zannettou et al. 2018a).
This provides a unique opportunity to study how the hateful
content would spread in the online medium, if there were no
restrictions.
To this end, we crawl the Gab platform and acquire 21M
posts by 341K users over a period of 20 Months (Octo-
ber, 2016 to June, 2018). Our analysis reveals that the posts
by hateful users tend to spread faster, farther, and wider as
compared to normal users. Our main contributions are as
follows-
• We perform the first study which looks into the diffusion
dynamics of posts by hateful accounts.
• We find that the hate users in our dataset (which consti-
tutes 0.3% of the total number of users) are very densely
connected and are responsible for 18.65% of posts gener-
ated in Gab.
In summary, our analysis reveals that the hatespeech has
a much higher spreading velocity. The posts of hateful users
receive much larger audience and as well at a faster rate. As
a case study, we also investigate the detailed account char-
acteristics of Robert Gregory Bowers, the sole suspect of the
Pittsburgh synagogue shooting6.
4https://goo.gl/QMU8e7
5https://goo.gl/9gAjDg
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Pittsburgh_synagogue_shooting
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
01
69
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 4 
De
c 2
01
8
2 Dataset Description
In order to understand the diffusion dynamics in Gab, we
collect a massive dataset of posts and users by following the
crawling methodology in (Zannettou et al. 2018a). We use
Gab’s API to crawl the site in a snowball methodology. We
first obtain the data for the most popular user as returned by
Gab’s API and then collect the data for all their followers
and followings. We collect the following types of informa-
tion: 1) basic details about each user like username, score,
account creation date; 2) all the posts of each user; 3) all the
followers and followings for each users. This resulted in a
massive dataset whose details are presented in Table 1. We
have only collected the publicly available data posted in Gab
and make no attempt to de-anonymize the users. We outline
the procedure to distinguish between hateful and non-hateful
users in the following section.
Property Value
Number of posts 21,207,961
Number of reply posts 6,601,521
Number of quote posts 2,085,828
Number of reposts 5,850,331
Number of posts with attachments 9,669,374
Number of user accounts 341,332
Average follower per account 62.56
Average following per account 60.93
Table 1: Description of the dataset.
2.1 Identifying hateful content
Gab has been at the center of several hate activity. With the
recent Pittsburg shooting, and removal of the app from play
store, it has become quite infamous. The volume of hateful
content is Gab is 2.4 times higher than that of Twitter (Zan-
nettou et al. 2018a) which justifies our choice of Gab. We
adopted a multi step approach to curate our dateset.
Lexicon based filtering: We created a lexicon7 of 45 high-
precision unigrams and bigrams that are often associated
with hate like ‘kike’ (slur against Jews), ‘paki’ (slur against
Muslims), ‘beached whale’ (slur against fat people). These
hate words were initially selected from the Hatebase8 and
Urban dictionary9. Words such as ‘banana’, ‘bubble’ are
present in hatebase which could easily appear in benign con-
text. In order to avoid ambiguity, we ran multiple iterations
and carefully chose those keywords which were not ambigu-
ous in Gab.
We leverage these high precision keywords to identify ex-
plicit hate posts based on their textual content. The total
number of unique posts which have been identified explic-
itly as ’Hate’ were 167,782 or 0.79% of the entire dataset.
However, since posts need not necessarily contain solely tex-
tual information (45.59% of all posts include an attachment
in the form of images, videos, and URLs), we resort to a
7The lexicon is available here: https://goo.gl/8iHTDP
8https://www.hatebase.org
9https://www.urbandictionary.com
diffusion based model of identifying hate users in the social
network.
Identifying hateful users: Using the high precision lexicon
would miss out on several users who might be hateful in
nature but are not selected as they did not post any content
with words from our lexicon (like using images and videos).
In order to capture such obscure hate users, we leverage the
methodology used by (Ribeiro et al. 2018b). We enumerate
the steps of our methodology below.
• We identify the initial set of hateful users as those who
have written at least 10 posts, with at least one hateful
keyword in each of them. This results in a set of 1863
hateful users.
• We create a repost network where nodes represents the
users and edge-weights denotes posting and reposting fre-
quency. We convert the repost network into a belief net-
work by reversing the edges in the original network and
normalizing the edge weights between 0 and 1. We ex-
plain this further in the subsequent section.
• We then run a diffusion process based on the DeGroot’s
learning model (Golub and Jackson 2010) on the belief
network. We assign an initial belief value of 1 to the 1863
users identified earlier and 0 to all the other users. The dif-
fusion model aims to identify users who did not explicitly
use any of the hateful keywords, yet have a high potential
of being a hate user due to homophily.
• We observe the belief values of all the users in the net-
work after five iterations of the diffusion process and di-
vide the users into four strata, [0, .25), [.25, .50), [.50, .75)
and [.75, 1) according to their associated belief.
We define users whose belief values lie within [.75, 1] as
hateful and those whose belief values lie within [0, .25) as
non-hateful with the additional constraint that each of these
users should have at least five posts. We do so since it is
difficult to judge a person on the basis of a single post.
We thus obtain a set of 1055 hateful users and 62827 non-
hateful users, which comprises 0.3% and 18.406% of the
entire dataset. We refer to the set of hateful and non-hateful
users as KH (read ’Known hateful user’) and NH (read ’Not
hateful user’) respectively henceforth.
DeGroot’s model of information diffusion: We illustrate
a repost network with three users (A, B, C) in Figure 1a.
An edge-weight of 9 from B to A denotes that user B has
reposted 9 posts of A while a self loop of A of weight 17
denotes that A has posted 17 times. We convert the repost
network into a diffusion network as shown in 1b by revers-
ing the edges, with the edge-weights normalized. The edge
weights are normalized by dividing the edge weight from C
to A in the original network by the sum of the edge weights
originating from C (including self loops). For example, user
C in Figure 1a has reposted A 5 times and has posted 10
times. Thus the value of edge weights from A to C is 515 or
0.33 and the weight of the self-loop at C is 1015 or 0.67 as
shown in Figure 1b. The normalized edge-weight is a mea-
sure of the user’s belief being influenced by her neighbors.
Let us denote the belief of A, B and C at the time instant i as
biA, b
i
B , b
i
C respectively. The belief of user C at time instant
i+ 1 can be written as
bi+1C = 0.33× biA + 0.67× biC (1)
Thus belief propagation takes place in an iterative fashion
using the DeGroot’s model. If we consider the initial beliefs
of A, B and C to be 1, 0 and 0 respectively, their correspond-
ing beliefs at time instant 1 would be 1, 0.75 and 0.33 as
demonstrated in Figure 1c.
(a) Repost Network (b) Belief Network (c) Belief diffusion
Figure 1: Description of the DeGroot’s model for informa-
tion diffusion in a toy network.
2.2 Dataset evaluation
We evaluate the quality of the final dataset of hateful and
non-hateful accounts through human judgment. We ask four
annotators to determine if a given account is hateful or non-
hateful as per their perception. The annotators consisted of
three undergraduate students with major in Computer Sci-
ence and one PhD student in Social Computing. Since Gab
does not have any policy for hatespeech, we use the guide-
lines defined by Twitter 2 for this task. We provide the anno-
tators with a class balanced random sample of 200 user ac-
counts 10. Each account was evaluated by two independent
annotators.
We observe that the two annotators found 86.9% and
93.2% of the hate accounts from our sample as hateful,
yielding a substantial high Cohen’s κ score of 0.69. Like-
wise 92.2% and 99.4% of the non-hateful accounts from our
sample were adjudged to be non-hateful yielding a very high
κ score of .87. These results show that the dataset generated
by our method is of high quality with minimal noise.
3 Diffusion dynamics of posts
In this section, we observe the diffusion of information
throughout the network and analyze the differences in dif-
fusion of posts generated by the hateful users and those gen-
erated by the non-hateful users.
3.1 Model description
We refer to the path traced by a post as it is reposted by
other users as a cascade and the original user as the root user.
10We have used a random sample of 200 accounts per class to
keep the monetary cost manageable
Since it is not possible to trace the exact influence path, i.e.,
the user who influenced the reposting, we leverage the social
network connections (followers and friends) as means of in-
formation diffusion and influence similar to (Taxidou and
Fischer 2014). In all the models, an edge is formed between
two users if there exists a follower-following relationship
between the users. We deploy the Least Recent Influencer
Model (LRIF) (Bakshy et al. 2011) to observe the informa-
tion diffusion. Previous research (Taxidou and Fischer 2014;
Alrajebah et al. 2017) have also used such models to study
the diffusion of information in online social media. In the
LRIF model, users are influenced by the first exposure to
a message even if they do not act immediately. Essentially,
the model seek to avoid exhaustive search by converting the
network into a directed acyclic graph, thereby, reducing the
time complexity. We illustrate the DAG generated by the
LRIF models in Figure 2. The sample network is shown in
Figure 2a comprising 5 users. A directed edge between any
2 users (say from B to A) specifies the follower-following
relationship (B follows A). The number beside each user
specifies the time of reposting, with A being the root user.
The DAG generated by the LRIF model is shown in 2b.
(a) Repost graph (b) LRIF model
Figure 2: DAG generated by the LRIF model on a sample
re-post network. The numbers indicate the time in seconds
of reposting. The links are formed between User C and A
since A posted earlier than B.
3.2 Characteristic cascade parameters
In order to characterize the cascades generated by KH
and NH users, we employ the following features as used
in (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018).
• Size represents the number of nodes in the DAG which
are reachable from the root user. It corresponds to the to-
tal number of unique users involved in the cascade of the
post.
• Depth is the length of the largest path from the root node
of the cascade. The depth of a cascade, D, with n nodes
is defined as
D = max (di), 0 ≤ i ≤ n (2)
where di is the depth of node i.
• Average depth is the average path length of all nodes
reachable from the root user. For a cascade with n nodes,
Posts Attachments Posts in groups Posts in topics
Feature Mean KH Mean NH Mean KH Mean NH Mean KH Mean NH Mean KH Mean NH
Size 1.27 1.22 1.33 1.25 1.43 1.41 1.60 1.55
Depth 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24
Breadth 1.12 1.11 1.14 1.12 1.17 1.15 1.25 1.27
Average Depth 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.21
Structural virality 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24
Table 2: Diffusion characteristics of posts of the hateful and the non-hateful users.
we define its average depth (AD) as
AD =
1
n
n∑
i=1
di (3)
where di is the depth of the node i.
• Breadth is the maximum no. of nodes present at any par-
ticular depth in the DAG.
B = max (bi), 0 ≤ i ≤ d (4)
where bi denotes the breadth of the cascade at depth i and
d denotes the maximum depth of the cascade.
• Structural virality as defined by (Goel et al. 2015), is the
average distance between all pairs of nodes in the DAG,
assuming the DAG to be a tree. It is simply the Weiner
index.
SV =
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
dij (5)
where dij represents the length of the shortest path be-
tween nodes i and j.
3.3 Experiments on varied nature of posts
All subsequent evaluation is carried out on the DAG gen-
erated by the LRIF model. We include only the posts of
KH and NH users which are not classified as ‘quotes’ or
‘replies’ since such posts have a low rate of repost. We also
observe the diffusion characteristics for posts having attach-
ments (images or media content) separately since such posts
are hypothesized to be more viral. The supposed virality is
attributed to the appeal of an image/ meme over plain tex-
tual information. Finally, in order to observe the community
perspective, we look into posts which have been posted in
groups and topics. We report the mean score of the cascade
features for the different experiments in Table 2.
3.4 Characteristic differences in cascades of the
hateful and non-hateful users
General cascade parameters: The mean size (number of
unique users) of a cascade is larger for posts of hateful users
than non-hateful users. The CCDF of a cascade’s size for
both KH and NH users is shown in Figure 3a. We observe
that although the maximum size of a NH’s cascade is larger,
the cascade’s size is significantly larger for KH users espe-
cially for the initial stages. Thus, the posts of hateful users
have a larger audience.
The mean breadth of a cascade is also larger for posts gen-
erated by hateful users implying that such posts spread wider
(farther amongst a user’s followers) than those generated by
NH users. The CCDF of a cascade’s breadth 3b exhibits sim-
ilar characteristics as a cascade’s size.
The mean depth, mean average depth and mean structural
virality of a cascade are also significantly larger for posts
generated by hateful users. Not only does it imply that such
posts diffuse deeper into the network but they are also more
viral (Goel et al. 2015). Moreover, as the CCDF for depth,
avg-depth and virality (Figures 3c, 3d and 3e respectively)
depicts, these properties remain consistently larger for the
KH users throughout their entire distribution.
Attachments and communal perspective: It is observed
that posts with attachments have a larger mean size, breadth,
depth, average depth and structural virality implying that
such posts have a greater outreach, diffuse wider, deeper and
are more viral. This agrees with our hypothesis that attach-
ments with memes and images are more instrumental in in-
formation diffusion than textual content.
These diffusion properties becomes more pronounced
when we consider only the cascades arising from posts in
groups and topics. Groups and topics both represent sub-
communities in GAB catered to a certain cause or serving a
niche interest. The primary difference between groups and
topics is that groups require prior approval for membership,
implying that they are more exclusive. Hence, the number
of users in a topic is more than those for a group which is
reflected in the larger characteristic values of the cascade, as
evident from Table 2.
The different characteristics manifest as significant (p −
value < 0.01) according to the KS-test for posts, attach-
ments and posts having a valid topic title. However, there is
no significant difference between the diffusion characteris-
tics of posts of hateful and non-hateful users within a group
itself. This can be attributed to the exclusive nature of the
group which ensures that users of similar nature are mem-
bers thereby diminishing the individualistic differences in
the posts. Likewise, due to their exclusivity the fractions of
groups which abound in Gab is relatively small. The num-
ber of posts posted in groups is 1103K while those posted in
topics are 976K.
Early adopters in a cascade: Figures 4a and 4b illustrate
the proportion of hateful and non-hateful propagators at each
depth. It is evident that the hateful users are early adopters
in the cascades of KH users, exhibiting strong degree of ho-
mophily. The reverse also holds true for non-hateful users
who are the early adopters in the cascades of NH users.
(a) CCDF of size (b) CCDF of breadth (c) CCDF of depth (d) CCDF of average depth (e) CCDF of virality
Figure 3: Different diffusion dynamics of the posts by hate and non-hate users using LRIF model. The cascade properties
namely size, breadth, depth, average depth and virality are larger for the posts of hateful users.
(a) % of KH propagators (b) % of NH propagators
Figure 4: The proportion of hateful and non-hateful users
who have reposted the root user across different depths. Hate
users are early propagators for the posts of hateful users
while non-hateful users are the early propagators for the
posts of non-hateful users.
The change in monotonicity of the curves in both the di-
agrams after depth 4 can be attributed to the small num-
ber of cascades whose depth exceeded 4 levels (0.0065%
and 0.0057% of KH and NH respectively). These are fast
cascades where the information was propagated by a larger
fraction of hateful users in KH posts and larger fraction of
non-hateful users in NH posts.
Temporal evolution of the cascade parameters: We also
explored the different temporal aspects of information diffu-
sion, namely the evolution of different cascade parameters
over time. We illustrate the temporal evolution for both KH
and NH cascades in terms of size, breadth, depth, average
depth and structural virality via the Figures 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d
and 5e respectively. For all such diagrams, the x-axis rep-
resents the specific characteristic (like size or depth) and
the y-axis represent the time taken in thousand seconds. It
is quite evident that the time taken for the KH cascades to
reach a particular value is lower in the initial stages imply-
ing that KH cascades are significantly faster initially. This
can be attributed to the high proportion of KH users as early
propagators.
Summary:
• The posts of hateful users diffuse significantly farther,
wider, deeper and faster than non-hateful ones.
• Posts having attachments as well as those exhibiting com-
munity aspect tend to be more viral.
• Hateful users are more proactive and cohesive. This ob-
servation is based on their fast repost rate and the high
proportion of them being early propagators.
• Hateful users are also more influential due to the signifi-
cantly large values of structural virality, average depth and
depth.
4 RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge there has not been any work
that tries to study the diffusion of hate in online social me-
dia. However, there are several works that looks into diffu-
sion in fake news (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Musta-
faraj and Metaxas 2017; Wu and Liu 2018), Linkedin (An-
derson et al. 2015), retweet cascade (Cheng et al. 2014;
Goel et al. 2015; Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Cheng et al.
2016), rumours (Friggeri et al. 2014; Leskovec et al. 2007;
Zhao, Resnick, and Mei 2015; Jin et al. 2013; Del Vicario et
al. 2016) and Tumblr (Alrajebah et al. 2017; Xu et al. 2014;
Chang et al. 2014; Alrajebah 2015). (Cheng et al. 2016) per-
form large scale analysis of recurring cascades in Facebook.
They observe that content virality is the main driver for re-
currence. In (Del Vicario et al. 2016), the authors perform
a large scale analysis of Facebook and observe that selective
exposure to content is the primary driver of content diffusion
and generates the formation echo chambers.
There is little research done on Gab. (Zannettou et al.
2018a) performed the first study in which the author col-
lected and analyzed a large dataset of Gab and found that
the site is predominantly used for discussion of news, world
events, and politics. They also found that Gab contains 2.4
times most hatspeech as compared to Twitter. (de Lima
et al. 2018) also found that Gab is very politically ori-
ented and users who abuse the lack of moderation dissem-
inate hate. (Zannettou et al. 2018b) perform a large scale
measurement study of the meme ecosystem by introducing
a novel image processing pipeline. Gab has substantially
higher number of posts with racist memes. Gab share hateful
and racist memes at a higher rate than manstream commu-
nities. Similarly, (Finkelstein et al. 2018) study millions of
comments and images from alt-right web communities like
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and the Twitter
clone, Gab and quantify the escalation and spread of anti-
semitism.
The majority of the research in hatespeech has been done
in the aspect of detection in various social media platforms
like Twitter (Waseem and Hovy 2016; Qian et al. 2018;
Davidson et al. 2017; Badjatiya et al. 2017), Facebook
(a) Size vs time (b) Breadth vs time (c) Depth vs time (d) Avg Depth vs time (e) Virality vs time
Figure 5: Temporal profiles of diffusion properties of the cascades generated by the posts of the hate and non-hate users. The
posts of hateful users spread farther, wider and deeper more quickly in the initial stages.
(Del Vigna et al. 2017), Yahoo! Finance and News (Warner
and Hirschberg 2012; Djuric et al. 2015; Nobata et al. 2016),
and Whisper (Mondal, Silva, and Benevenuto 2017). In an-
other online effort, a Canadian NGO, the Sentinel Project11,
launched a site in 2013 called HateBase 8, which invites In-
ternet users to add to a list of slurs and insulting words in
many languages. There are some works which have tried to
characterize the hateful users. In (Ribeiro et al. 2018a), the
authors study the user characteristics of hateful accounts on
Twitter and found that the hateful user accounts differ sig-
nificantly from normal user accounts on the basis of activity,
network centrality, and the type of content they produce. In
(ElSherief et al. 2018b), the authors perform a comparative
study of the hatespeech instigators and target users on Twit-
ter. They found that the hate instigators target more popular
and high profile Twitter users, which leads to greater on-
line visibility. (Mathew et al. 2018) looks into the aspects
of counterspeech on hateful YouTube video and develops
machine learning models to automatically detect counter-
speech in YouTube comments. In (ElSherief et al. 2018a),
the authors focus on studying the target of the hatespeech -
directed and generalized. They observe that while directed
hate speech is more personal and directed, informal and ex-
press anger, the generalized hate is more of religious type
and uses lethal words such as ‘murder’, ‘exterminate’, and
‘kill’.
5 Discussion
Account characteristics of hateful and non-hateful users:
We analyze the differences in the account characteristics of
hateful and non-hateful users. The different account charac-
teristics include the number of posts, followers and follow-
ings (normalized over time) and the number of likes, dis-
likes, replies, reposts (normalized over the number of posts)
of the KH and NH users. The normalization over time is
done by dividing the account characteristic (say number of
posts) of an user by the number of days elapsed from the
first post of the user to the date the last post was crawled.
We report the mean and median details of these character-
istics in Table 3. We measure the statistical significance be-
tween the two distributions using the two sample K-S test
and observe that each of the account characteristics are sig-
nificantly different (p-value<0.001). The inordinate differ-
ence in the mean and median values between NH and KH
11https://thesentinelproject.org
Feature Mean KH Mean NH Median KH Median NH
post 10.19 0.68 3.49 0.079
follower 1.97 0.67 0.72 0.15
following 1.99 0.95 0.32 0.06
like 2.60 1.54 1.46 0.70
dislike 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.00
score 2.54 1.738 1.41 0.89
reply 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.00
repost 0.35 0.23 0.14 0.00
F:F 4.90 5.05 1.66 1.56
Table 3: Account characteristics of the hateful and the non-
hateful users. Hateful users generates more popular con-
tent and also posts frequently. All the differences in account
characteristics are significant(p-value<0.001).
can be attributed to the prolific activity of hateful users. The
raw quantity of posts generated by the KH and NH amount
to 18.65% (3.95M) and 52.94% (11.22M) of all posts re-
spectively. This implies that 0.3% of the users generated
18.65% of the content and thus KH users are significantly
more influential.
Network characteristics: In this section, we look into the
network characteristics of the hateful and non-hateful users
on the basis of their follower-following relationship. We
construct a subgraph over the entire network with nodes be-
ing the set of hateful and non-hateful users and edges rep-
resenting the follower-following relationship between these
users only. This subgraph so formed has 63K nodes and 8.33
M edges. We observe that the network of hateful users (1K
nodes, 42.4K edges) is≈ 20 times more dense than the non-
hateful users (62.8K nodes, 7.45M edges). The hateful users
also demonstrate higher reciprocity values (58.3%) as op-
posed to the non-hateful users (55.9%). Moreover, a non-
hateful user is 6.8 times more likely to follow a hateful user
than a hateful user following a non-hateful user, inkling at
the higher popularity of hateful users. It is also 22.75 times
more likely that a hateful user will follow another hateful
user than a non-hateful one. This indicates strong cohesive-
ness between the hateful users.
Case study of Pittsburg shooting: In the aftermath of the
Pittsburg synagoue shooting6, the owners were forced to
shutdown the site temporarily for a week 12. The reason be-
hind the decision to ban the website arose from Robert Bow-
12https://www.technadu.com/godaddy-forces-gab-shut-down-
temporarily/46040
Account characteristics Value Normalized value
post 206 1.355
follower 212 1.395
following 232 1.526
like 568 2.757
dislike 2 0.01
score 566 2.748
reply 113 0.549
repost 114 0.553
F:F 0.91379 - -
Table 4: Description of onedingo’s account characteristics
ers’ history of posting anti-Semitic messages on Gab (under
the username @onedingo). Bowers allegedly killed eleven
people at a Pittsburgh synagogue with a gun on October 27,
2018.
We illustrate the account characteristics of @onedingo
that were present in our dataset in the Table 4. We observe
that all the characteristics of @onedingo are close to the
characteristics of the hateful users shown in Table 3. We
also manually looked into the user’s posts and found sev-
eral hateful instances such as this :“Kikes are enemy number
one. Dealing with anything after will be a relative piece of
cake. I will not fire on someone who is shooting my enemy”.
Moreover, not only were 23% of onedingo’s followings but
also 14% of his followers were hateful users.
Limitations of the current study : In our analysis we have
relied on the user account to study the cascade. We assume
that the hateful posts of these hateful accounts would gen-
erate majority of the reposts. This means that few of the re-
posts of these hateful accounts might not be hateful in na-
ture. However, while we cannot claim to have captured the
full picture, our analysis provided a peek into the cascade
dynamics of the hateful posts in Gab.
6 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we perform the first study which looks into the
nuances of the diffusion characteristics of the posts made by
hateful and non-hateful users. We used high precision key-
words to select hateful users and provide them as input to
the DeGroot’s model to identify the hateful and non-hateful
set of users. We then analyse the diffusion characteristics of
the posts of these users. We found that the posts made by
hateful users tend to spread farther, faster, and wider. These
hateful users are densely connected with each other and gen-
erate almost 1/5th of the content in Gab despite comprising
0.3% of the users.
Our work also points to several open research avenues.
A large fraction of the posts were in the form of images in
case of hate users. For the future work, we could look into
the task of building a classification system that can distin-
guish between images/videos that are hateful in nature. An-
other interesting direction would be to look into the diffusion
characteristics of the individual hateful posts instead of the
accounts.
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